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FIXING THE FAULTY FORUM FRAMEWORK:




During an episode of The Andy Griffith Show, bumbling
deputy Barney Fife addresses newly incarcerated inmates. His
speech to the men includes the following lines:
Now, men, there are a few things we ought to
get straightened out right at the start to avoid
any grief later on. Now, here at "The Rock"
we have two basic rules. Memorize them so
that you can say them in your sleep. The first
rule is: "Obey all rules!" Secondly, "Do not
write on the walls, as it takes a lot of work to
erase writing off of walls."'
At least one of the funny aspects of this announcement is
the simplicity of the rules: only two rules and one of them is to
obey all rules. The first rule indicates that there are even more
rules that must be obeyed; Barney, however, had probably not yet
thought of those rules. Rules that are not clearly defined give little,
if any, guidance to those who are expected to obey them. Further,
rules that are not clearly defined give unbridled discretion to those
who enforce and interpret them. Sadly though, unclear and
undefined rules are exactly what one encounters in cases dealing
with speech occurring in a public forum. This article seeks to
* Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, State of
Alabama. J.D., The University of Alabama School of Law. The author is also
a Blackstone Fellow with the Alliance Defense Fund.
1. The Andy Griffith Show: The Big House (CBS television broadcast,
May 6, 1963).
discuss the flaws existing in the forum framework developed by the
Supreme Court, illustrate how the flaws have created conflicting
opinions among the circuit courts, and recommend how to
eliminate the difficulties experienced by those courts.
"To determine whether a potential speaker has a right to
use public property for expressive purposes, a court must first
examine the nature of that property. A potential speaker's rights
depend, in part, upon the type of government property that the
speaker seeks to access.",2 In Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n,3 the Supreme Court constructed the public fora
framework that governs cases dealing with restrictions on speech in
public places.4 In Perry, the Perry Education Association (PEA)
was the "exclusive bargaining representative for the teachers of the
Metropolitan School District of Perry Township, Ind[iana]."' A
rival teachers union, the Perry Local Educators' Association
(PLEA), was denied access to the "interschool mail system and
teacher mailboxes in the Perry Township schools";6 under PEA's
agreement it was the only union to have such access! In deciding
whether PLEA had a right to access the mail system and mailboxes,
the Court noted that the "existence of a right of access to public
property and the standard by which limitations upon such a right
must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the property
at issue."' In looking at the "character of the property at issue," the
Court described three types of publicly owned property in the terms
of public fora: 1) those "places which by long tradition or by
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate";9 2) a
"second category consist[ing] of public property which the State has
opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity"; 1°
2. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Dep't of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 1151
(7th Cir. 1995).
3. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
4. Id. at 45-49.
5. Id. at 38-39.
6. Id. at 39.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 44.
9. Id. at 45.
10. Id.
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and 3) nonpublic fora." The Court also established the level of
scrutiny that is to be used by courts when addressing restrictions on
speech occurring in each type of fora.' 2
II. TRADITIONAL PUBLIC FORA
Traditional public fora are those places which "have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions."" Those places include public parks, sidewalks, 4 and
other areas that have "traditionally been available for public
expression" . These are places where people are free to congregate
and discuss any matters they wish. Traditional public fora are not
16created by government action.
Content-neutral restrictions of speech occurring in
traditional public fora are to be "narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest' ' 17 and must "leave[] open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.""
Examples of such restrictions are those dealing with time, place,
and manner of speech.' 9
"Content-based restrictions on speech in traditional public
fora are subject to strict scrutiny."20 Under a strict scrutiny analysis,
11. Id. at 46.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 45 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496,515 (1939)).
14. But see United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 728-29 (1990)
(holding that sidewalk on Postal Service property is not a public forum).
15. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992).
16. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677
(1998) (contrasting traditional public fora with designated public fora by
noting that the latter are "created by purposeful governmental action.").
17. Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1147 (10th Cir.
2001) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1988)).
18. Id. at 1147 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1988)).
19. Id.
20. Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union, Local 100 v. City of
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''restrictions must serve a compelling government interest and be
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 2 1 "If a less restrictive
alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature
must use that alternative."2 2 Not requiring the government to use
the least restrictive means of restricting speech would be the
equivalent of restricting speech without adequate justification.
23
Whether content-based or content-neutral, restrictions on
speech in traditional public fora must be viewpoint neutral.
2
III. SECOND CATEGORY OF PUBLIC FORA
The second category of public fora has been called the
"more amorphous category., 25  From the first time this type of
forum was addressed, the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals,
and the district courts have struggled to properly define it. This
struggle has lead to conflicting rulings arising in free speech cases
that have similar fact patterns. An overview of some of these
conflicting rulings is in order.
A. The Second Category of Public Fora under United States
Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has referred to the second category as
"designated public forum, whether of a limited or unlimited
character, "designated public fora, ' ,27 and "the public forum
New York Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 545 (2d Cir. 2002).
21. 1d. at 545.
22. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); see
also Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)
('The Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally
protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the
least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.").
23. Playboy Entrn't Group, 529 U.S. at 813 (citing Reno V. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 874 (1997)).
24. Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 170 (2d Cir. 2001).
25. Planned Parenthood Ass'n/Chi. Area v. Chi. Transit Auth., 767 F.2d
1225, 1231 (7th Cir. 1985).
26. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992).
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created by government designation."2
The Court first addressed the boundaries of the second
category of public fora in Widmar v. Vincent,2 a pre-Perry
decision."' In Widmar, the University of Missouri at Kansas City
had a stated policy of encouraging the "activities of student
organizations."3' The university officially recognized over one
hundred student groups and university facilities were provided for
meetings held by organizations that had registered with the
university. 2 One such organization was Cornerstone, a registered
religious group.33 From 1973 to 1977 it had regularly received
permission to meet in university facilities.34  The university
informed Cornerstone in 1977 that, under a regulation prohibiting
the use of university buildings or grounds for religious worship or
religious teaching, the organization would no longer be allowed to
meet in university facilities.3' The Court classified the program
enacted by the university as creating a limited public forum36 and
considered the issue to be whether the university, after opening its
facilities for use by student groups, could "exclude groups because
of the content of their speech., 37  In analyzing whether the
university had engaged in unconstitutional content-based
discrimination, the Court used strict scrutiny." While the university
argued that allowing Cornerstone to meet in university facilities
would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,
the Court held that an "equal access" policy would not violate the
27. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998).
28. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479-80 (1988) (quoting Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)).
29. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
30. Id. at 265-73.





36. Id. at 272.
37. Id. at 273.
38. Id. at 270 (confirming that the university had to show that its actions
were -'necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end").
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Clause. 9 The scrutiny used by the Court in the case was important
because it indicated, prior to the fora framework that would soon
be described by the Court, what analysis should be given by courts
when addressing a limited public forum.
Two years later, in Perry, the Court again discussed the
"second category" of public fora.4 ' The Court considered this
property to be "public property which the State has opened for use
by the public as a place for expressive activity."'" They considered
the second type of public fora to be a "forum generally open to the
public -42 and established that this type of fora is one that is created
by the State. 3 This description by the Court contains no limitations
on who may participate or what topics may be discussed in this type
of forum. In a footnote, the Court cited its decision in Widmar to
support the idea that this type of "public forum may be created for
a limited purpose such as use by certain groups.., or for the
discussion of certain subjects."4 Thus, the rule in Perry, when
considered with Widmar, instructs that the second category of
public fora is property the State has opened for use by the public as
a place for expressive activity. In some cases, property that is
opened for expressive activity may be opened for use by certain
groups or for the discussion of certain subjects. The second
category of public fora is simply one that, prior to its creation by a
government body, does not exist.
A "limited" public forum was, under Perry and Widmar,
one type of the second category of public fora. Under the same
decisions, another type of the second category of public fora would
have been a created public forum in which no limitations had been
placed on either the topics to be discussed or the groups that may
participate in that forum. 5 Such a forum would have been a
designated public forum. PLEA took the position that its previous
39. Id. at 270-71.
40. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
45-46 (1983).
41. Id. at 45.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 46 n.7 (citation omitted).
45. Id. at 45-46; Widmar v. Vinceni, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981).
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use of the system, combined with the use of the system by some
,Inon -school-connected ',16groups, had caused the school mail
facilities to become a "limited public forum , 47 in the second
category of public fora and that it could not be excluded from
periodically using the system.4' The Court rejected that argument,
noting that "[t]his type of selective access does not transform
government property into a public forum, 49 and concluded that
"the school mail system is not a public forum.'
50
The Court again addressed the limited public forum in
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.S' In
Cornelius, several "legal defense and political advocacy
organizations" sought participation in the Combined Federal
Campaign (CFC), "a charity drive aimed at federal employees.
52
President Eisenhower established the forerunner of the CFC in
1957. 53 Over twenty years later, President Reagan responded to a
district court ruling regarding the CFC, and issued executive orders
designed "to restore the CFC to what he determined to be its
original purpose. '"' - After the modifications by President Reagan,
participation in the CFC was limited to "voluntary, charitable,
health and welfare agencies that provide or support direct health
and welfare services to individuals or their families",55 and excluded
"[a]gencies that seek to influence the outcomes of elections or the
determination of public policy through political activity or
advocacy, lobbying, or litigation on behalf of parties other than
themselves."56
The Court discussed the public fora framework constructed
in Perry and noted, "In addition to traditional public fora, a public




50. Jd. at 48.
51. 473 U.S. 788, 795 (1985).
52. Id. at 790.
53. Id. at 792.
54. Id. at 794.
55. Id. at 795 (citation omitted).
56. Id. (citation omitted).
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forum may be created by government designation of a place or
channel of communication for use by the public at large for
assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the
discussion of certain subjects."' 57 In this passage the Court refers to
at least two types of public fora as comprising the second category
of public fora, both created by government action. One type is a
forum opened for the public at large and the other is one in which
the government body has limited the forum to certain groups or
topics." The Court examined how, in past cases, it had "looked to
the policy and practice of the government to ascertain whether it
intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly
and debate as a public forum.""
One of the cases in which it had "looked to the policy and
practice of the government" was Widmar-noting that in Widmar it
"found that a state university that had an express policy of making
its meeting facilities available to registered student groups had
created a public forum for their use. '"" The Court also noted that
the policy in Widmar "evidenced a clear intent to create a public
forum.",6' The Court stated, "Not every instrumentality used for
communication, however, is a traditional public forum or a public
forum by designation. 62 While it seems at this point in the opinion
that the Court will hold that a limited public forum has been
created, it does not. The Court noted that the government's policy
was to limit participation in the program to "appropriate" agencies
and that "selective access, unsupported by evidence of a purposeful
designation for public use, does not create a public forum. ',6' The
CFC was considered by the Court to be a nonpublic forum; the
57. Id. at 802 (relying upon Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 n.7).
58. There is, of course, the possibility that both the groups and topics
could be limited in a limited public forum. Such a forum should still be a
limited public forum.
59. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
60. Id. at 802 (citing Widmar v Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 (1981)).
61. id. at 802.
62. Id. at 803 (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 130 n.6 (1981)).
63. Id. at 805.
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standard used in reviewing the policy was whether the distinctions
drawn were reasonable and viewpoint neutral. '4
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District,"i the issue before the Supreme Court was whether, under a
state law allowing local school boards to permit outside groups to
use school property after hours, it was constitutional "to deny a
church access to school premises to exhibit for public viewing and
for assertedly religious purposes, a film series dealing with family
and child-rearing issues."'' In that case, the court of appeals had
held that the school property, when used by outside groups under
the state law, was neither a traditional nor designated public forum;
rather, the lower court held that the property was "a limited public
forum open only for designated purposes. 6 7 The appellate court, in
this statement, combined the two types of public fora comprising
the second category. By thoroughly analyzing the Church's
argument that, because the school property had been used for a
"wide variety of communicative uses, it should be granted the
same constitutional considerations as property in a traditional
public forum, the Court could have clarified the second category of
public fora and corrected the lower court's error. The Court,
instead, merely "assume[d]"6 9 that the lower courts were correct on
the issue of the nature of the forum,7" and then further clouded the
issue of public fora.
Referring to "public property that is not a designated public
forum open for indiscriminate public use for communicative
purposes,"" the Court remarked, "Control over access to a
nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker
identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of
64. Id. at 805-06.
65. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
66. Id. at 387.
67. Id. at 390 (quoting Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 386 (2d Cir. 1992)).
68. Id. at 391.
69. Id. at 392.
70. Id. at 391-92.
71. Id. at 392.
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the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral. 7 2 The
Court here is quoting Cornelius, in which a forum having the
characteristics of a limited public forum is categorized as nonpublic
in nature. While the Court could have used Lamb's Chapel as an
opportunity to return to the original forum framework, it instead
created more confusion for the lower courts. While there may be
"public property that is not a designated public forum open for
indiscriminate public use for communicative purposes"73 but is open
for certain groups or the discussion of certain topics, such property
is not nonpublic fora.
Under Widmar and Perry, the Court had established that
such public property opened for the limited uses mentioned by the
Court would be limited public fora; public fora separate and distinct
from traditional, designated, and nonpublic fora. It would be
governed by different standards and a completely different analysis
would need to be done to determine whether restrictions on speech
occurring in such a forum would be constitutional. Should the
property be analyzed under the second category of public fora,
courts would use a higher level of scrutiny, giving more protection
to those who seek to access the forum.74 After classifying the forum
in Lamb's Chapel as nonpublic, the Court resolved the issue on the
• . 75
basis of viewpoint discrimination, the one form of discrimination
76
unconstitutional in any forum . The opportunity both to correct
the lower court's misinterpretation of Perry and to discuss the
72. Id. at 392-93 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)) (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 392.
74. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983). Considering the second category of public fora, the Court noted,
"Reasonable time, place, and manner regulations are permissible, and a
content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling
state interest." Id.
75. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393.
76. See Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, Tenn., 221 F.3d 834, 845
(6th Cir. 2000) ("In both designated public fora and nonpublic fora, the
government may not discriminate based upon the viewpoint of the speaker.");
see also Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 167 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Government
restrictions on speech in a traditional public forum are subject to strict
scrutiny.").
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proper analysis to be done when addressing restrictions on speech
occurring in a limited public forum was lost.
In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia. the Court further added confusion to the second category
of public fora. In Rosenberger, Wide Awake Productions (WAP), a
student group that had qualified under a program of the University
of Virginia to become a "Contracted Independent Organization"
(CIO), sought reimbursement from the Student Activities Fund
(SAF) for printing charges submitted by a third-party contractor. 7s
The SAF denied the request on the grounds that WAP was
participating in a "religious activity," a violation of the guidelines of
79the program. While the Court would later characterize its decision
as holding that the forum in Rosenberger was a limited public forum
in the second category of public forum," the decision itself does not
support that conclusion. It is so difficult, in fact, to read from the
decision that the forum was of the second category that circuit
courts have characterized the limited public forum in Rosenberger
as a nonpublic forum."
In Rosenberger, after acknowledging that the "State must
respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set, 82 the Court noted
that government may regulate speech only in a way that is
77. 515 U.S 819 (1995).
78. Id. at 823-25.
79. Id. at 827.
80. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000). "We
have held, for example, that an individual's contribution to a government-
created forum was not government speech." Id. (referencing Rosenberger, 515
U.S. 819) (emphasis added).
81. See Chiu v. Piano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 345 n.10 (5th Cir.
2001) (citing Rosenberger to support the statement that "[i]n more recent
cases.... the Court has used the phrase 'limited public forum' to describe a
type of nonpublic forum of limited open access"); see also DiLoreto v.
Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 1999)
("The Supreme Court has used the term 'limited public forum* to refer to a
type of nonpublic forum that the government intentionally has opened to
certain groups or to certain topics .. " (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
829)); but c.f Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d
242, 248-49 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Rosenberger as an example of a limited
public forum which is a type of the designated public forum).
82. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
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reasonable and viewpoint neutral."s  These two limitations4
constitute the scrutiny applicable in nonpublic forum cases. Not
only did the Court not analyze whether the SAF engaged in
content-based discrimination; it emphasized a distinction between
content-based discrimination, which may be permissible, and
viewpoint discrimination, which is presumably impermissible.
Thus, the Court's analysis and holding that WAP's denial for
funding was based upon viewpoint discrimination 1' indicate that it
considered the forum to be a limited forum but that such a forum is
nonpublic in nature.
In Good News Club v. Milford Central School,7 the Court
directly addressed speech restrictions occurring in a limited public
forum. The parties in that case, however, had agreed that Milford
Central School (Milford) had created a limited public forum and
the Court simply "assume[d]" that Milford operated one.8' Because
the Court assumed that a limited public forum had been created, no
analysis was done to determine what public forum, if any, existed.
Without the analysis, no guidance was given to lower courts on how
to recognize a limited public forum or where it falls in the public
forum framework. Although the Court did not conduct an analysis
to determine what public forum, if any, had been created by
Milford, we can, once again, determine where the Court placed a
limited public forum in the framework by the standard of review it
used in the case.
The Court's analysis in this area was whether the restriction
was based upon viewpoint discrimination 9 and whether the
restriction was "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum." 90 This analysis is the scrutiny that is to be given when
83. Id.
84. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983).
85. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30.
86. Id. at 832.
87. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
88. Id. at 106.
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
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courts are examining nonpublic fora.9' Further, the Court cites
Rosenberger and Cornelius in support of this analysis. As we have
seen, Cornelius classified a limited public forum as nonpublic in
nature and Rosenberger failed to clarify the issue by using only
reasonableness and viewpoint discrimination in analyzing a limited
public forum. Thus, in Good News Club the Court once again
rejected the guidance of Perry and indicated that a limited public
forum is a type of nonpublic forum.
B. The Second Category of Public Fora under the Circuit Courts of
Appeal
The inability of the Supreme Court to accurately and
consistently define the second category of public fora has created
problems for the circuit courts when trying to interpret Supreme
Court precedent. A brief overview of the problems encountered by
the circuits is in order.
When the Second Circuit considered Good News Club,92 the
court drew no distinction between designated and limited public
fora and held that the restrictions on these public fora must be
"reasonable and viewpoint neutral." 3 The Second Circuit has also
referred to a "sub-category of the designated public forum called
the 'limited public forum'" and defined it as a forum, the use of
which "is limited to particular purposes or speakers."94
The Third Circuit has also expressed confusion over where
the limited public forum falls in the public forum framework. In
Whiteland Woods v. Township of West Whiteland,9 the court noted,
"Although there is some uncertainty whether limited public fora
are a subset of designated public fora or a type of nonpublic fora....
91. While viewpoint discrimination is not allowed in any category of
public fora, the Court did not look at whether content-based discrimination
occurred, indicating the scrutiny for nonpublic fora.
92. 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000).
93. Id. at 508-09.
94. Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 167 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Gen. Media Communications, Inc. v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 278 n.6 (2d Cir.
1997)).
95. 193 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1999).
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we have generally applied to limited public fora the constitutional
requirements applicable to designated public fora."" Not only does
the circuit generally apply the same constitutional requirements to
both the designated public forum and the limited public forum, it
must consider them to be one and the same. In Christ's Bride
Ministries, Inc. v. SEPTA,97 the court noted "that SEPTA has
created a designated public forum '"9 while on the same page
referring to the "limited public forum created by SEPTA." 99
The Fifth Circuit has also struggled with the second
category of public fora. In Chiu v. Plano Independent School
District,'" the court expressed its confusion this way:
Despite the acceptance of a middle category
between traditional and nonpublic forums,
there is some confusion over the terminology
used to describe this category. Two terms-
"designated public forum" and "limited public
forum"-have been utilized by the Supreme
Court, our sister circuits, and this court, yet
there has not been agreement on their
meaning. Specifically, it has not been clear
whether the terms could be used
interchangeably to describe the middle tier of
forum, or in fact describe different types of
forums subject to different levels of First
Amendment scrutiny. 101
The court went on to note that its more recent cases "seem
to accept the concept of a limited public forum as being a
subcategory of the designated public forum, the regulation of which
is subject to less rigorous scrutiny."'0 2 It noted that when the Fifth
Circuit considered Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School District'°3
96. Id. at 182 n.2 (citation omitted).
97. 148 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 1998).
98. Id. at 255.
99. Id.
100. 260 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2001).
101. Id. at 345-46.
102. Id. at 346 n.10.
103. 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999). While this case was overturned by
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both the majority and dissent "seemingly accepted that limited
public forums fell within some part of the designated public forum
category."''" In addressing Supreme Court cases, the Fifth Circuit
noted that "the Supreme Court now clearly distinguishes
designated public forums subject to strict scrutiny from limited
public forums that are not.' 5 Prior to that statement, however, the
court had noted that, while in some recent cases the Court had
referred to a limited public forum as "a type of nonpublic forum of
limited open access,"'' 6 in an even more recent case it "used the
phrase limited public forum to designate the intermediate forum
category, as opposed to a nonpublic forum."'07 The Fifth Circuit in
this case indicates that its problem in deciding what the different
terms mean and its struggle to apply the proper standard, arises
from the Supreme Court's lack of clear and unequivocal guidance
on the rules regarding public fora. Circuit courts should not
"seemingly accept" matters critical to First Amendment analysis.
In DeBoer v. Village of Oak Park,00 the Seventh Circuit
referred to the second category as "designated public forum,"'' 9 but
also noted that the Supreme Court has used the term "limited
public forum" to describe a forum that is open "for certain groups
or for the discussion of certain topics.' '"" The court expressed its
confusion over which term and which level of scrutiny to use in the
case, noting that the Supreme Court's previous uses of the term
"limited public forum" had created "analytical ambiguity" and
"confusion over the proper terminology.''''
In Summurn v. Callaghan,"' the Tenth Circuit addressed the
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), it is used
here to illustrate how the Fifth Circuit struggles in interpreting its own
precedent involving the second category of public fora.
104. Chiu, 260 F.3d at 346 n.12 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 346.
106. Id. at 346 n.10 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S 819, 829 (1995)).
107. Id. (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 304).
108. 267 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2001).
109. Id. at 565.
110. Id. at 566.
111. Id. at 566-67.
112. 130 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1997).
309
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
problems it had in trying to interpret Supreme Court precedent
dealing with public fora. In Sumrnurn, a church sought to have a
stone monolith engraved with its religious tenets placed on county
property near a stone monolith engraved with the Ten
Commandments."3  The monolith on which the Ten
Commandments had been engraved had been placed on the
county's property by a private fraternal order some years earlier.'
4
Summum argued that its Free Speech Rights had been violated
because the county property had become a public forum and it had
been denied access to that forum. '
In addressing Summum's contention that the courthouse
lawn was a "limited public forum,""' the court noted:
[Tlhere is some confusion over this term in the
case law. It is not clear whether Summum uses
"limited public forum" to refer to a designated
public forum that is subject to heightened
scrutiny, or to a nonpublic forum that is subject
to a reasonableness standard. Summum's (and
the district court's) confusion is readily
understandable in light of the inconsistent
manner in which the Supreme Court itself has
used this term."
The court's opinion illustrates that Summum and the district
court were not the only ones confused over how to identify the
public forum in the case. In addressing the second category of
public fora, the court cites Perry for the proposition that a
"designated public forum may be created for a 'limited purpose' for
use 'by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain
subjects.' "'11 The Perry decision, however, does not directly
indicate that a limited public forum is a type of a designated public
forum. In Perry, the Court referred to a "second category
113. Id. at 910.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 911.
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consist[ing] of public property which the State has opened for use
by the public as a place for expressive activity"" and, in a footnote,
included the idea that "a public forum may be created for a limited
purpose such as use by certain groups... or for the discussion of
certain subjects.'' 2" That section of Perry should be read to indicate
that the second category of public fora is property that the State has
opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity; in
some cases property that is opened for expressive activity may be
opened for use by certain groups or for the discussion of certain
subjects.
The Tenth Circuit traced the idea of the limited public
forum to Widmar and categorized that decision as indicating that a
limited public forum was a subcategory of the designated public
forum and that strict scrutiny should be used when analyzing such
cases. 2' In examining the more recent Supreme Court cases, the
court noted that the term "limited public forum" had been used "to
describe a type of nonpublic forum.' ' 12  The court was unable to
determine whether Summum used the term "limited public forum"
to refer to a type of the second category of public fora or as
nonpublic fora.1"' The trouble the court had with clarifying the
forum framework was summarized in a footnote:
We recognize that the boundary between a
designated public forum for a limited purpose
and a limited public forum is far from clear.
Because we conclude that Summum is not
alleging that a designated public forum has
119. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
120. Id. at 46 n.7 (citation omitted).
121. Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 914 (10th Cir. 1997).
122. Id.
123. Id. ("It is not clear whether Summum uses 'limited public forum' to
refer to a designated public forum that is subject to heightened scrutiny, or to
a nonpublic forum that is subject to a reasonableness standard."); Id. at 915
("Our review of the record and briefs persuades us that Summum does not use
'limited public forum' to mean property which falls within the category of a
designated public forum."). It is unclear from the opinion why the court did
not schedule oral arguments where Summum could have simply been asked
what it meant by its use of the term.
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been created, we do not have to clarify the
precise distinctions between the two. We
simply note that a designated public forum for
a limited purpose and a limited public forum
are not interchangeable terms. We use the
term "limited public forum" here to denote a
particular species of nonpublic forum, in
accordance with the manner in which
Summum, the Supreme Court in Rosenberger
and Lamb's Chapel, and some commentators
define that term.1
24
The court held that the installation of the Ten
Commandments monument was "enough to transform the property
into a limited public forum as it has more recently been defined by
the Supreme Court" ;2 the property "cannot be characterized as a
purely nonpublic forum reserved for official uses.,
126
In Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, Tennessee,127 the
Sixth Circuit noted that three categories of public fora are
recognized in that circuit. 28 Those categories are: 1) traditional
public forum; 2) designated public forum; and 3) nonpublic
129
forum. In a footnote, however, the court noted "that there has
been some uncertainty among the circuits as to whether there are
one or two categories of fora other than 'public' and
'nonpublic.' ,,130
Other circuits have also had trouble correctly classifying the
types of fora. While noting in a parenthetical that it is "sometimes
called a limited public forum," the First Circuit has referred to the
second category as a "designated public forum.' 3' The Fourth
124. Id. at 916 (citation omitted).
125. Id. at 919.
126. Id.
127. Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, Tenn., 221 F.3d 834 (6th Cir.
2000).
128. Id. at 842.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 842 n.5.
131. New Eng. Reg'I Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 20 (1st
Cir. 2002).
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Circuit has referred to "[a] designated public forum, whether
limited or unlimited in scope."'3 2 The Ninth Circuit refers to the
second category as "designated public forum."'33  The Federal
Circuit has referred to the second category as "designated public
fora."'11 In Children of the Rosary v. City of Phoenix, the Ninth
Circuit opined: "A designated public forum is a nontraditional
forum that the government has opened for expressive activity by
part or all of the public.','1
5
C. Correcting the Problem
The forum framework used by courts allows citizens to
know whether they have "a right of access to public property"'
13 6
and, if so, how limitations upon the exercise of the right will be
evaluated by courts.33 Citizens cannot know if they have a right of
access to a particular piece of government property if courts do not
consistently instruct them on how to identify the types of property.
Further, government bodies will be unable to constitutionally apply
limitations if they are not given clear instructions on when and
where particular limitations can be applied. Courts should not
confuse a designated public forum with a limited public forum
because the two are easily distinguishable from each other. Courts
should revert back to the forum framework as it was originally
constructed in Perry.
132. Sons of the Confederate Veterans v. Comm'r of the Va. Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 622 n.10 (4th Cir. 2002).
133. See, e.g., DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196
F.3d 958, 964 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Children of the Rosary v. City of
Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 1998).
134. Griffin v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1321 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
135. Children of the Rosary, 154 F.3d at 977.




1. Designated Public Fora
When courts revert back to the original forum framework,
they will hold that a designated public forum exists when
government creates a public forum in an area that, before its
designation as public fora, had been off-limits to free speech. In
other words, a designated public forum should be considered an
area that, prior to its designation as a public forum, was neither a
public park, sidewalk, or another type of area that has "traditionally
been available for public expression. Once opened, however, it
would have the constitutional characteristics of a traditional public
forum.' 39 Designated public fora, courts should hold, are limited
only in a sense of time and space. Regardless of whether a forum is
limited to a geographical boundary or a time frame, the boundary
must have been established by government action. A designated
public forum would differ from a traditional public forum in that it
must be created by a government body and, once created, may be
destroyed by that same governing body. A designated public
forum would differ from a limited public forum in that there would
be no limitation on either the groups that may participate in the
forum or in the topics that could be discussed. A designated public
forum would differ from a nonpublic forum in that it is open to the
public for speech activities.
Content-neutral restrictions in a designated public forum,
such as time, place, and manner regulations are permissible as long
as they are reasonable . 4' This is true now and would be true under
a return to the original forum framework.
Content-based restrictions on speech in a designated public
forum would pass constitutional muster only if, as with traditional
public fora, they are: (1) "necessary to serve a compelling state
interest" and (2) "narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.', 4 2 As in
138. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
678-80 (1992).
139. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
140. Hawkins v. City and County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1286-87
(10th Cir. 1999).
141. DeBoer v. Village of Oak Park, 267 F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir. 2001).
142. Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union, Local 100 v. City of
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a traditional public forum, the government must use any less
restrictive alternatives it may have available.' Further, the
governing body establishing the restrictions "must leave open




Regardless of whether the restrictions on speech in a
designated public forum are content-based or content-neutral, they
must be viewpoint neutral.1
45
2. Limited Public Fora
If courts were to return to the original forum framework, a
limited public forum would be found whenever government opens
public property that has traditionally been off-limits to public
speech, but limits the topics that may be discussed or the groups
that may participate in the forum.46 A limited public forum would
also be created if both the topics that may be discussed and the
groups that may participate in the forum are limited. A limited
public forum is property that has been opened for public expression
but "that is not a designated public forum open for indiscriminate
public use. 14'7 The limitation to which "limited public forum" refers
is a limitation on who may speak and what topics may be
discussed .
New York Dep't. of Parks and Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 545 (2d Cir. 2002)
(quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
800 (1985)).
143. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000);
See also Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)
("The Government may... regulate the content of constitutionally protected
speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least
restrictive means to further the articulated interest.").
144. New Eng. Reg'l Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 20 (1st
Cir. 2002).
145. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
392, 393-94 (1993).
146. See Chiu v. Piano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 346 (5th Cir. 2001)
(noting that the Supreme Court has "used the term 'limited public forum' to
describe forums opened for public expression of particular kinds or by
particular groups.").
147. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 384.
148. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., U.S 819,
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It is important that courts begin to recognize and discuss the
proper classification of limited public fora. The importance lies in
the level of protection that speech in the forum would be afforded
under a proper analysis. As we have seen, when a limited public
forum is incorrectly classified as a nonpublic forum, the only
inquiry courts make is whether the restriction on speech is
reasonable and viewpoint neutral. This does not give as much
constitutional protection as does strict scrutiny, the level of review
used when courts are analyzing restrictions on speech in a
traditional or designated public forum. Due to the possibility that
certain groups and topics could be lawfully excluded at the time a
limited public forum was created, it would be necessary for courts
to use two levels of review in such cases. While, like other circuits,
it has misidentified the nature of limited public fora,'49 in Hotel
Employees & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 100 v. City of
New York Department of Parks & Recreation, the Second Circuit
properly explained how restrictions in a limited public forum
should be analyzed. For restrictions on speech activities that fall
inside a category for which the limited public forum had been
opened, courts should apply strict scrutiny." This is because "in a
limited public forum, government is free to impose a blanket
exclusion on certain types of speech, but once it allows expressive
activities of a certain genre, it may not selectively deny access for
other activities of that genre."'' Limitations on speech activities
falling outside a topic or group category for which the limited
forum had been opened are not to be subjected to a strict scrutiny
analysis. Rather, such limitations are constitutional if they are
reasonable and viewpoint neutral. If the limitation is one as to
which groups may participate in expressive behavior at the location,
829 (1995).
149. See Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union, Local 100 v. City
of New York Dep't. of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 545 (2d Cir. 2002)
(referring to a limited public forum as a "subset of the designated public
forum").
150. Id.
151. Id. at 545-46 (quoting Travis v. Owego-Appalachian Sch. Dist., 729
F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1991).
152. Id. at 546.
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any content-based regulation would be subject to a strict scrutiny
analysis. The regulation would have to be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest. Regulations on speech in
this type of limited public forum would have to be content neutral.
This would provide the same protection as a traditional or
designated public forum.
IV. NON-PUBLIC FORA
Public property that has neither by tradition nor designation
been open to public discourse is a non-public forum."' One court
has stated, "A forum may be considered nonpublic where there is
clear evidence that the state did not intend to create a public forum
or where the nature of the property at issue is inconsistent with the
expressive activity, indicating that the government did not intend to
create a public forum. ' ' 1 4 Examples of non-public fora include
military reservations,' jailhouse grounds,1 6  and school157
newspapers. While a forum may be considered non-public, that
status does not allow the government to restrict speech in any way
it likes."18 Restrictions in nonpublic fora must be reasonable in light
of the government body's interest and must be viewpoint neutral.159
While content-based restrictions are allowed, restrictions on
speech must not be drawn in an effort to suppress expression• . 161
because officials disagree with a specific viewpoint. "The
reasonableness of the Government's restriction of access to a
nonpublic forum must be assessed in the light of the purpose of the
153. See Chiu v. Piano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 347 (5th Cir.
2001).
154. Id. (quoting Estiverne v. La. State Bar Ass'n, 863 F.2d 371, 376 (5th
Cir. 1989)).
155. See Greer v. Spock, 424 UJ.S. 828, 838 (1976).
156. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, passim (1966).
157. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988).
158. Ark. Educ. Television v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 682 (1998).
159. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
806 (1985).
160. Id.
161. Griffin v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1321 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
forum and all the surrounding circumstances."'6 2  That
reasonableness "is determined by a fact-intensive test that takes
into account such factors as the uses to which the forum is typically
put, the particular risks associated with the speech activity at issue,
and the proffered rationale for the restriction.',
63
Consider, for example, the concerns that a state would have
for presentations given in a state prison. A prison system may have
a non-public forum at which inmates listen to presentations on
topics aimed at increasing their chance of finding a good job upon
release. The system would not, for obvious reasons, allow
presentations on how to be a professional locksmith or how to
improve one's shooting skills. Such regulations would be
reasonable in light of the state prison system's interest in keeping
inmates incarcerated and in an appropriate rehabilitation program.
Another problem that exists with the forum framework is
found in a specific type of nonpublic forum. When government
bodies, functioning in a proprietary role, regulate their property,
courts will generally find that a non-public forum exists.6' In the
past, courts have recognized areas such as advertising space on
16" 166buses, a fence at a high school baseball field, and vanity plates
issued for automobiles 67 as being among those areas in which
government bodies were acting as proprietors. When this is done,
courts have held restrictions on speech to be constitutional. A
proper analysis of these cases indicates that a limited public forum,
and not a type of non-public forum, is created when government
acts as a proprietor. Some restrictions on speech that have been
allowed in these cases may not have survived the heightened
scrutiny used by courts when a limited forum is found to have been
162. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809.
163. New Eng. Reg'l Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 20 (1st
Cir. 2002).
164. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672 (1992); see also Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
165. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303-04.
166. DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958,
967 (9th Cir. 1999).
167. Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 167 (2d Cir. 2001) (referring to the
"revenue-raising aim of the vanity-plate regime").
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created.
The idea that a non-public forum exists when government• - 168
acts as a proprietor has its roots in Lehman v. Shaker Heights, a
case pre-dating the forum framework first described in Perry. In
Lehman, a candidate for political office attempted to buy
advertising space on the Shaker Heights (Ohio) Rapid Transit
System to promote his campaign.169 The city sold advertising space
on the vehicles in its public transportation system through
Metromedia, a company that contracted with the city to sell the
171
advertising space. Under the contract Metromedia had with the
city, the selling of political advertising was strictly banned. 7 When
he attempted to purchase advertising space, the political candidate
was informed that political advertising was not permitted."' The
Supreme Court disagreed with the candidate's argument that the
advertising space at issue was a public forum."' The Court
summarized the difference it saw between traditional public fora
and the advertising space in question:
Here, we have no open spaces, no meeting hall,
park, street corner, or other public
thoroughfare. Instead, the city is engaged in
commerce. It must provide rapid, convenient,
pleasant, and inexpensive service to the
commuters of Shaker Heights. The car card
space, although incidental to the provision of
public transportation, is a part of the
commercial venture. In much the same way
that a newspaper or periodical, or even a radio
or television station, need not accept every
proffer of advertising from the general public, a
city transit system has discretion to develop and
make reasonable choices concerning the type of
168. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
169. Id. at 299.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 299-300.
172. Id. at 300.
173. Id. at 300-01.
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advertising that may be displayed in its
vehicles.'74
The Court further stressed the economic nature of the ban
on political advertising by comparing it to a decision by the city to
raise the fares or locations of the bus stops 7 The Court noted that
the city's actions could not be "arbitrary, capricious, or invidious.',
76
Courts have used Lehman to suggest that, when analyzing a free
speech case in which a government body is acting as a proprietor,
raising money or facilitating the conduct of its business, a bright-
line rule dictates that a non-public forum is at issue. 7 7 However, in
light of the date of the Lehman decision, it need not be read to
indicate such a bright-line rule. As Lehman preceded Perry, the
idea of a second category of public fora had not yet been fully
addressed by the Court. The discussion of fora in Lehman is
limited to traditional public and non-public fora. The "open
spaces .... meeting hall, park, street corner, or other public
thoroughfare" litany provided by the Court' 78 would certainly be
classified as traditional public fora. 7' The Court did not discuss
whether the advertising space in question might have been
classified as belonging to the second category of public fora. This
may be due to the fact that the case preceded the Perry decision, in
which the Court would more fully address the idea of a second
category of public fora. Had Lehman been decided after Perry, the
Court may have decided that the advertising space at issue was a
limited public forum belonging to the second category of public
fora. In Lehman, the Court noted that Shaker Heights had "limited
access to its transit system advertising space"'80 and that the
174. Id. at 303.
175. Id. at 303-04.
176. Id. at 303.
177. See DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d
958, 958 (9th Cir. 1999).
178. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303.
179. Further, the Court acknowledges Lord Dunedin's comment of
"open spaces and public places." Id. at 302 (quoting M'Ara v. Magistrates of
Edinburgh, 1913 Sess. Cas. 1059, 1073).
180. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added).
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limitation was one not permitting political advertising.'"' Courts
viewing Lehman in this manner may view certain economic
activities by governments creating limited public fora.
In Children of the Rosary v. City of Phoenix,"2 the Ninth
Circuit addressed "whether there is a likelihood that limiting
advertising on municipal buses to 'speech which proposes a
commercial transaction' violates the First Amendment."'" Children
of the Rosary dealt with advertising space the City of Phoenix sold
on the exterior panels of its buses . Prior to November 1, 1996,
advertising "supporting or opposing a candidate, issue or cause, or
which advocates or opposes a religion.... or belief" was prohibited
by the city's standards.' While this regulation was in effect, the
city rejected an advertisementI'6 from the group Children of the
Rosary (COR)"' COR obtained an injunction that required the
city to display the ad.W'8  Advertising standards that "limited the
subject matter of bus advertising to 'speech which proposes a
commercial transaction' " took effect on November 1, 1996."9
After being informed that its advertisement would no longer be
181. Id. at 300.
182. Children of the Rosary v. City of Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972, 974 (9th
Cir. 1998).
183. Id. at 974.
184. Id. at 975.
185. Id.
186. "The proposed advertisement stated:
'Before I formed you in the womb, I knew you'-God
Jeremiah 1:5
CHOOSE LIFE!
[COR Logo] Children of the Rosary
The COR logo is a fetus surrounded by a rosary, which is connected to a
cross at the top." Id.
187. Id.
188. "The revised advertisement stated:
'Before I formed you in the womb, I knew you'-God
Jeremiah 1:5
Purchase this message as a bumpersticker for your vehicle!
Contact [phone number]
[COR Logo] Children of the Rosary CHOOSE LIFE!"
Id.
189. ld.
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displayed because it did not propose a commercial transaction,
COR submitted a new ad to be displayed. " ' The city rejected this
ad because it viewed the advertisement's primary purpose as being
"not to propose a commercial transaction, but instead promote a
noncommercial message."' 9 ' An advertisement proposed by the
Arizona Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was also rejected by the
city.19 2 The court was persuaded by the city's policy of rejecting
political and religious advertisements that it never intended to
create a public forum. 93 Referring to Lehman, the Ninth Circuit
cited that case as "strongly support[ing] our conclusion that the
advertising panels are nonpublic fora.' 94 The court dismissed the
appellants' argument that, because Lehman was decided prior to
Perry and is inconsistent with subsequent Supreme Court decisions,
it should not be used to find that the advertising panels are a non-
public forum.9 5 In doing so, the court briefly summarized Supreme
Court cases in which Lehman had been mentioned and the
proposition for which the Court had cited the case.' These cites
did not go to what should have been viewed by the court as the
heart of the case: whether the city's policy of selling advertising
while limiting the sales to advertisements that "propose[] a
commercial transaction"'97 created a limited public forum.
It is important to note that if a government body engaging
in a proprietary function does not appropriately use "discretion to
develop and make reasonable choices concerning the type of
advertising,"'98 courts may find that a public forum has been
created. When addressing whether the selling of advertising has
created a public forum, courts often examine whether the
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. "Their advertisement stated:
The ACLU Supports Free Speech for Everyone
To purchase this bumper sticker please call [phone number]."
Id.
193. Id. at 976.
194. Id. at 977.
195. Id. at 977-78.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 975.
198. Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974).
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government has used discretion to refuse noncommercial
advertisements.", In Planned Parenthood Ass'n/Chicago Area v.
Chicago Transit Authority, Winston Network, Inc. ("Winston")
had an exclusive contract with the Chicago Transit Authority
("CTA") "to accept and place cards, signs, and other forms of
advertising" on advertising space on property owned by CTA.
2
01
Other than not accepting "immoral, vulgar, or disreputable
advertisements," Winston was not restricted in accepting
202
messages. Planned Parenthood Association/Chicago Area
("PPA") repeatedly sought advertising space in CTA buses and
transit cars; their requests were denied by CTA.203 The Seventh
Circuit agreed with the district court that the CTA had created a
public forum. 2w Although CTA maintained that it had a policy of
declining controversial public-issue advertising, the court noted
that CTA's "lais-sez-faire [sic] policy" virtually guaranteed access
to anyone willing to pay the fee. 2  "CTA's willingness to
accommodate all advertisers" distinguished this case from Lehman,
in which there had been a longstanding ban on political
advertising. Because CTA had allowed "a wide variety of
commercial, public-service, public-issue, and political ads, 20 1 to be
displayed in its advertising space, it could not argue that such
displays were "incompatible with the primary use of the
199. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n/Chi. Area v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Lebron v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 749 F.2d 893, 896 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Children of the Rosary,
154 F.3d at 975.
200. 767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985)
201. Planned Parenthood Ass'n/Chi. Area, 767 F.2d at 1227.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. The Seventh Circuit did not address whether the public forum was
designated or limited in nature, finding that it was just a "public forum." Id. at
1232.
205. Id. at 1229.
206. Id. at 1232.
207. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Dep't of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 1153
(7th Cir. 1995).




Our First Amendment right to free speech is too precious to
be treated in a haphazard fashion. For too long, federal courts have
created and then ignored confusion over public fora. There is no
reason for this confusion to exist. The rules by which one
determines what type of public forum has been created by a
government body should be clearly defined and consistently used
by federal courts.
Courts should immediately begin to clarify public fora by
consistently using the designations of "traditional," "designated,"
"limited," and "non-public" in an appropriate fashion. Those
designations, when used with careful precision, will strengthen the
protections the First Amendment affords us. Until those
designations are consistently used correctly, conflicting rulings will
continue to emerge from the courts of appeal and the United States
Supreme Court.
209. Id.
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